Dividends of the Iran war

The war may not yet be fully over, but if it returns, it will be only for a brief interregnum, allowing Donald Trump to declare victory. announce the mission over. It will surely entail increased Iranian losses of lives. treasure, but it will be the off-ramp that Trump had sought a few days into the war, and Iran had refused to hand it to him. At a cost, Iran announced to the world that it was unwinnable. The age of the middle power had arrived. Most international observers had made the point. Trump was in the wrong war against the wrong country in pursuit of the wrong aims. History, geography, the environment and civilisational proclivity say a lot about an intended adversary. Knowing them before an adventure can save from blunderous embarrassment.

Could the US not have won a full victory, given that there can be various definitions of it? The US has enough in its tank to achieve what finally became the full definition of victory. say, in Japan, Korea or Iraq. But one, it would have called for another kind of war, of which there is neither an appetite nor the need,. in cost-benefit analysis, it would not deliver the goods as efficiently as can be achieved through other means. Hence. the desperation in the US to somehow exit a war that failed to deliver the intended results within the planned resources. Could Iran have helped end the war sooner? It knew it could not win. Surely, but held out sturdily even at serious expense to itself. It gave the regime salvation and redemption from the brewing vitriol of the Iranian people against it. If the US had miscalculated strategically, Iran held on to conflict as a godsend. a recipe out of its homegrown predicament. How long such an escape may last is an entirely different matter.

A standing lesson from the history of war was reinforced. Territory is the ultimate winner, and geography decides the kind of war that will be fought. Regardless of how successful the missiles. the drones were in the Iran war, this is not the war that will be fought between the US and China, or between India and Pakistan. A long coastal border - 50 kilometres wide at its narrowest,. 380 kilometres at its widest - was easily span-able with missiles, drones, boats and artillery. But consider the attrition of the same means over a longer distance and see the percentage of success drop exponentially. The US remained untouched in the war; Iran did not have the means. It filled in by attacking America's forward military bases in Bahrain, Qatar and Kuwait. Iran, as a strategy, spread the war and the pain widely. It was unlikely to win Iran friends despite Trump's egregiousness. The world continues to suffer from such ill-consideration on both sides.

Among other lessons, overrunning middle powers with populations matching those of Iran, Turkey. Pakistan is impossible in the modern era, given the friction that population centres and modern infrastructure pose. Large, open expanses where free runs are possible for mechanised infantry and armour are a thing of the past. Global interdependencies, sensitivity to supply chain disruptions, and a far more interconnected world make wars highly time-sensitive. The window available to the combatants to achieve their aims is therefore narrow. Resource. intensity must then be calibrated to produce the desired effects within the limitations imposed by the nature of war. This forces modern wars to be short and intense, aiming to punish, pain and coerce. Winning territory is either peripheral or improbable. Aggressors aim to coerce, while defenders aim to deter. The campaigns must thus be designed to deliver these objectives. The US failed to coerce Iran, while Iran successfully absorbed the pain and punishment. The strategy. means to the intended end were misplaced and faulty, failing to achieve the objectives efficiently for the US.

Major dividends of the Iran war, though, have emerged in the geopolitical domain. It shows how the effects traverse across spaces and boundaries. Trump's visit to China for his summit with Xi Jinping produced multi-dimensional consequences. China emerged as a credible equal to the US, far ahead of 2050 when it was considered most likely. Materially. in indices defining great powers, it may still need to cover the distance that separates the two, but in perception and effect, a US needing China's support to steer the war in Iran propped China up multiple notches. Despite an overt emphasis on bilateralism in the talks. the war in Iran would have found mention multiple times during the summit.

How Trump closes the war on Iran will be perceived as carrying certain Chinese concurrence. China wants Hormuz open normally, and will not support Iran going nuclear as a member of the P-5. It strengthens the USA's stance, leaving it to Trump to make it happen. If that is not the first major intervention by China in determining the global order, what is? The wages of Trump's misconception of the war will now include China's overarching reach in seeking an equal seat at the table with the US. especially where the effects are global. A recent piece in NYT declared that 'China has arrived'. By terms, it is an admission of an equal in the sacrosanct league.

Saudi Arabia. at the head of a likely ten-state consortium, is reportedly considering offering Iran a regional compact for long-term peace. If it materialises, it shall be the biggest geopolitical turnover of the Iran war. There are various drivers to this offer: USA is busy resolving its own dilemma with Iran with little time or effort to spare for others; the closure of Hormuz may hold only a symbolic importance for the US. is the lifeline for the neighbouring Arab nations. The Arabs want to work out a viable, acceptable mechanism with Iran to keep the strait functional;. finally, this may be yet another plank to deliver what Iran seeks - a long-term assurance for peace and non-aggression, especially when most GCC countries house bases which remain Iran's principal threat in the short-term. If concluded, it can complement the peace effort between the US and Iran, allaying many of Iran's fears.

Lastly, among middle powers, it establishes the role of Pakistan, Egypt, Turkey. Saudi Arabia as net security stabilisers in a region where Israel has practically run amok on the back of unreserved support and timid and tacit bystanding of Arab nations. With the USA's exclusivity compromised to a degree, Israel's support base too is weakened. Israel isn't yet done fully,. with the rise of the four Muslim nations in a cooperative role, it places a check on Israel's agenda to seek 'greatness' beyond its borders. The Iran war exposed the limits of coercive supremacy, accelerated regional balancing and strengthened resilient middle powers.

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**Author: American**